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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROYAL STREET LAND COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

No. 19480

WILLIAM J. REED and
PATSY REED,
Defendants-Respondents

Royal Street Land Company, the plaintiff in the
District Court and the appellant herein, respectfully submits
this Opening Brief, by and through its counsel of record.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered by
District Judge Homer Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District
Court for Summit County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The Summary Judgment from which Royal Street appeals
stems from rulings made by District Judge Homer Wilkinson upon
a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of William J.
Reed and Patsy Reed, defendants in the District Court and the
respondents herein, which Motion, though previously denied, was
purportedly renewedo, and from rulings upon a Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Royal Street.

The said Summary Judgment

granted the Reeds' renewed Motion and denied Royal Street's
Motion.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Royal Street asks that this Court reverse the Summary
Judgment appealed from and direct that the District Court enter
judgment against the Reeds in favor of Royal Street.

In the

alternative, Royal Street asks that this Court remand this case
to the District Court for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Royal Street commenced this action on or about October
23, 1979 with the filing of a Complaint (R. 001-004) seeking to
quiet title to the following described real property situated
in Summit County, Utah against the Reeds and First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A.:
BEGINNING at a point South 748.93 feet and East
540.14 feet from the West 1/4 corner of Section
15, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; thence North ll°44f30" East
246.00 along an old fence line to the South Right
of Way line of the ONTARIO RR SPUR; thence South
88°19?30ff East 107.91 feet along said Right of
Way; thence South 6°22f30M West 222.80 feet along
an old fence line to existing road; thence South
82°59'30" West 134.210 feet along road to point
of BEGINNING.
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. did not respond to the
Complaint and its default was duly entered on December 19,
1979.

(R. 014). The Reeds answered the Complaint asserting,

inter alia, the defense of title by adverse possession and
the defense that Section 78-12-5 Utah Code Annotated (Repl.
Vol. 9A 1977) barred Royal Street's action because of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

history of possession by the Reeds and their tenants and
predecessors.

(R. 019-021).

A period of discovery between Royal Street and the
Reeds then ensued.

(See R. 016-018, 024-031, 032-046,

047-051, 053-067, 068-069, 071-073, and 074-094).
In May of 1982, the Reeds filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment with supporting papers, including several affidavits.
(R. 103-105, 106-118, 119-124, 125-153, 154-156, 157-165, and
167-192).

This Motion essentially conceded Royal Street's

record title to the surface estate.
and 194-196).

(See, e.g., R. 167-173

The focus of the Motion was therefore upon

establishing title to the surface estate through proof of the
occupation and use of the property by the Reeds and their
tenants and predecessors under instruments purportedly
providing some color of title, as opposed to actual legal
title, and through evidence and argument with respect to the
assessment and payment of taxes.

(See, e.g., R. 173-192).

Royal Street responded to the Reeds' Motion with an affidavit
and a lengthy Memorandum.

(R. 194-220 and 221-243).

A hearing was held on the Reeds' Motion on July 6,
1982 (R. 244-245, 246, and 247), at which time it was made to
appear that the real property comprised a part of certain
patented millsites known as the Trump Millsite, the Goodell
Millsite, and the Olive Branch Millsite.
221).

(See, e.g., R.

Royal Street's interest in this real property was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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acquired by Royal Street from Greater Park City Company
("Greater Park") on October 14, 1975 as a part of a larger
tract consisting of approximately 40 acres.
222 and 224-227).

(See, e.g. , R.

Greater Park had, in turn, acquired its

interest in this 40 acre tract from United Park City Mines
Company ("United Park") on October 11, 1975. (See, e.g., R.
222 and 228-231).

Royal Street's title to the real property

traced through the foregoing and other mesne conveyances to the
patents under which the Trump Millsite, the Goodell Millsite,
and the Olive Branch Millsite were patented.
222 and 232-237).

(See, e.g., R.

Accordingly, Royal Street had the record

title and claimed the exclusive right to possession of the
surface estate in the real property.

(See, e.g., R. 195).

From all that appeared, title to the mineral estate in the real
property remained in United Park, which excepted and reserved
the mineral estate when it conveyed the 40 acre tract to
Greater Park in 1975.

(R. 195).

Prior to 1962, there was no evidence of the existence
of any instrument purporting to reflect the existence of title
to the real property in the Reeds or anyone through whom they
purported to claim.

The evidence, rather, was that sometime

beginning in the laite 1920fs, one William Lawry, a shift boss
for the Park Utah Consolidated Mining Company, Judge Mine
Division, built a house and double garage and erected other

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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improvements upon the property.

(R. 155). In 1946, the house

and garage were deeded by Mr. Lawry and his wife to one Ray L.
Pedersen.

(R. 158 and 161). Mr. Pedersen died in 1954 and,

thereafter, Mr. Pedersen1s widow "[intending] to establish . . .
an exclusive ownership right to the house . . . purchased the
house by payment of past due taxes at a tax sale and received
title to the house by Quit Claim Deed from Summit County dated
June 6, 1955 . . . ."

(R. 158 and 162; emphasis supplied).

In

1956, Mr. Pedersen's widow filed a document titled "Declaration
of Homestead1' with the Summit County Recorder's Office,
evidently out of some concern over taxes.

(R. 158, 160, and
4

163-164).

This "Declaration of Homestead" referred only to

"[t]he ninth house on the South side of Deer Valley, Park
City, Utah."

(R. 163-164; emphasis supplied).

The first

instrument in the Reeds' "chain of title" purporting to reflect
title to the real property rather than merely the house or
garage thereon is a Quit Claim Deed to the Reeds from Edith
Rasband, a/k/a Edith Pedersen, dated August 13, 1963,
purporting to convey all of grantor's right, title, and
interest in the property, describing it as follows:
"House No. 570, with double garage, being the
ninth (9th) house on the rear, South side of Deer
Valley, Park City, Utah, including all land
surrounding the house between the lateral fence
lines and extending from the road in front to the
road in the rear." (R. 107, 113, and 165).
It was this instrument upon which the Reeds principally relied
for colorDigitized
of by
title.
173-174).
From
all BYU.
that appeared,
the Howard W. (R.
Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

there was no other instrument in the Reeds' "chain of title"
except for a Quit Claim Deed from the Reeds to themselves dated
August 8, 1973, which utilized a metes and bounds description
identical to that appearing in Royal Street's original
Complaint.

(R. 108 and 114-115).

This 1973 Quit Claim Deed is

the only instrument in the Reeds' "chain of title" that employs
the metes and bounds description appearing in Royal Street's
original Complaint or, for that matter, any metes and bounds
description.
The evidence with regard to the assessment and payment
of taxes was, of course, of central importance to the
determination of the issues raised by the Reeds' Motion and is
best understood with the facts and sequence of events set forth
above in mind.
There was no evidence that the Reeds or anyone through
whom they claim paid any taxes prior to 1955 or 1956. Edith
Rasband, a/k/a Edith Pedersen, evidently "paid all taxes
assessed against the home and improvements" between 1955 or
1956 and 1962, but appears not to have paid or even to have
been aware of "taxes being assessed against the surrounding
real property."

(R. 169; emphasis supplied).

The Reeds

evidently paid taxes assessed by Summit County during the years
1962 to 1973, but those taxes were assessed against property
described as "9th House S. Side Deer Valley PC House #570 with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

double garage."

(R. 110 and 117). The Summit County tax

notices for the years 1962 to 1973 disclose on their face that
the assessment was made only on buildings or improvements and
not on the real property itself.

(See, e.g., R. 117). It

was not until 1973, the year in which the Reeds made the Quit
Claim Deed to themselves which contained a metes and bounds
property description identical to that appearing in Royal
Street's original Complaint, that the Summit County tax notices
directed to the Reeds began to reflect an assessment of the
real property designated by the said metes and bounds
description in addition to a house and garage.
118).

(R. 110 and

The Reeds evidently paid these taxes for only six (6)

years -- 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 -- before the
commencement of this action.

(R. 62-63).

The Reeds did not

claim to have paid the 1979 taxes until October 31, 1979.
63).

(R.

This action was filed on October 23, 1979 -- before the

Reeds claimed to have paid the 1979 taxes.

Consequently, there

was never a seven (7) year period prior to the commencement of
this action in which taxes were shown to have been assessed
against the real property described in Royal Street's original
Complaint and to have been paid by the Reeds or their
predecessors.
Furthermore, the evidence, including an Affidavit of
John Stewart submitted by the Reeds, disclosed that between at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

least 1939 and through 1977 taxes were assessed by the State
Tax Conunission "for both the surface and mineral rights of the
Goodell, Olive Branch, and Trump Millsites", of which the real
property is a part.

(R. 120 and 122-124; emphasis supplied.

See also R. 74-76).

The Reeds did not claim to have paid any

of these taxes and, indeed, it appeared that they were paid
through 1976 by United Park and its predecessors.

(R. 74-76).

The surface and the mineral estate in the Trump
Millsite, the Goodell Millsite, and the Olive Branch Millsite
were considered to have been severed for the purposes of State
taxation in 1977 (R. 121), presumably due to the prior sale by
United Park of the surface estate in the 40 acre tract now
owned by Royal Street.

Thereafter, the State taxes on the

mineral estate were assessed to and paid by United Park.
74-76).

(R.

Taxes on the surface estate in the 40 acre tract

should have been assessed to Royal Street from at least 1977,
but were finally assessed and paid by Royal Street through 1980
in 1980.

(R. 222-223).

Thus, it was not until 1977 that the

State Tax Commission ceased taxing both the surface and the
mineral estate in the real property and recognized the
authority of Summit County to tax the surface estate.
Moreover, at least part of the surface estate in the 40 acre
tract was taxed twice for each of the years since 1976; the
surface estate in the entire 40 acre tract was taxed to Royal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Street and that portion of the tract described by the metes and
bounds description appearing in Royal Street's original
Complaint was taxed to the Reeds.
Based upon the foregoing, Royal Street urged, among
other things, that the evidence failed to show that the Reeds
or their predecessors had "for seven years continuously . . .
paid all taxes which had been levied and assessed upon [the]
land according to lawM as required to establish title by
adverse possession under Section 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated
(Repl. Vol. 9A 1977) (emphasis supplied).

(See, e.g., R.

201-202).
The Reeds raised their claim that the action was
barred by Section 78-12-5 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A
1977) at the July 6, 1982 hearing.

(R. 247). Royal Street

thereafter briefed this issue pursuant to leave granted for
that purpose.

(R. 247-251).

Royal Street urged, in this

regard, that the Reeds' argument misconceived the meaning and
purpose of Section 78-12-5.

(R. 237-241 and 259-264).

On August 6, 1982, the District Court entered a minute
order denying the Reeds1 Motion.

(R. 273). A formal Order

denying the Motion was thereafter submitted and entered.

(R.

304-306).
0,

On or about August 16, 1982, Royal Street filed a
Motion for Full or Partial Summary Judgment.

(R. 277-279).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This Motion essentially urged that the denial of the Reeds'
Motion required that summary judgment be granted in favor of
Royal Street.

(R. 280-283).

on August 30, 1982.

A hearing was held on this Motion

(R. 284 and 285).

At the August 30, 1982 hearing, counsel for the
parties agreed that the trial set for October of 1982 could be
stricken and the case decided upon the materials in the
District Court's file.

(R. 285). At this hearing, the Reeds

filed a conclusory Second Affidavit of John Stewart, which was
basically to the same effect as Mr. Stewart's prior affidavit
and specifically reiterated that according to the records of
the State Tax Commission, the taxes assessed by the State Tax
Commission on the Goodell, Olive Branch, and Trump Millsites
were upon both the surface and the mineral estate of the said
claims.

(R. 285 and 291-295; compare R. 119-124).1

However, based upon the said Second Affidavit, the Reeds
purported to renew their prior Motion for Summary Judgment.

1.
The Second Affidavit essentially expanded upon the
prior Affidavit by including a hypothetical discussion of the
taxation of nonmining improvements to or uses of the surface
estate of mining claims. This subject matter is treated infra
at pages 25 through 29 and footnote 7. The Second Affidavit
also contained a conclusory and hypothetical discussion of the
State's taxing scheme as applied to mining claims. This taxing
scheme is examined infra at pages 25 through 34. As urged
before the District Court, the statutes establishing that
scheme and the case law concerning it obviously control to the
extent, if any, that they may be inconsistent with Mr.
Stewart's views. (See R. 289).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R. 285). The District Court took the matter under
advisement.

(R. 285). Further memoranda were submitted.

(See, e.g., R. 286-290).
On November 19, 1982, the District Court entered a
minute order denying Royal Street's Motion and granting the
Reeds1 renewed Motion.

(R. 307).

In the process of preparing a judgment, counsel for
the parties discovered that the description utilized in Royal
Street's original Complaint failed to describe the property to
which the Reeds actually claimed title by adverse possession
and, instead, described other real property near by but
separate and distinct from that property.
and 321-327).

(See, e.g., R. 319

This error and corresponding references in the

record were eventually corrected by the adoption by the
District Court on September 8, 1983 of a Stipulation concerning
o
these matters. (R. 348-352).
The Reeds thereafter submitted a form of Summary
Judgment.

(R. 346 and 353-356).

Royal Street objected to this

2
The District Court's Order adopting the said
Stipulation provided as follows:
"Upon motion, pursuant to stipulation, and good
cause therefor appearing, it is hereby
"ORDERED that Royal Street Land Company's
Complaint is deemed amended nunc pro tunc to delete
the legal description now contained therein and to
substitute therefor the following described real
property located in Summit County, State of Utah:
Digitized
by the Howard W.
Law Library,
(CONTINUED
ONHunter
PAGE
12)J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proposed form upon several grounds, including its incorporation
of certain purported findings, the fact that the change of
description made it clear that the Reeds had never paid any
taxes on the property that they actually claimed, and the fact
that a portion of the property actually claimed by the Reeds
had previously been dedicated by Royal Street to Park City as a
roadway.

(R. 331, 341, and 342-345).

The Summary Judgment

eventually entered by the District Court struck the purported

FOOTNOTE 2 CONTINUED FROM PAGE 11:
Beginning at a point which is South 748.63 feet and
East 449.63 feet from the East Quarter corner of
Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; thence North 12°l4f40" East along
an old fence line 246.08 feet to the south Right of
Way line of the Ontario RR Spur; thence South
88°27?52" East along said Right of Way Spur 108.60
feet; thence South 6°58f30" West along an old fence
line 222.80 feet to the north line of an existing
road; thence South 82°59f47" West along said north
line 134.70 feet to the point of beginning. Basis of
Bearing is the easterly line of the Southeast Quarter
of said Section 16, which bears South 0°30tlltf West.
Contains 0.6340 acres, more or less.
and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the legal description set forth
above be deemed the property which is the subject of
all previous pleadings and proceedings in this matter
and, unless the context otherwise requires, any
reference in previous pleadings submitted to the court
or in rulings, orders or other decisions by the court
to the "property", the "subject " property, the
"disputed" property and so on be deemed to be directed
to the property, the legal description of which
appears above."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

findings, but was otherwise as originally submitted by the
Reeds.

(R. 353-360).
This appeal followed.

(R. 362-363).

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE REEDS1
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN DENYING ROYAL STREET'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Reeds do not dispute that Royal Street has record
title to the surface estate of the property at issue in this
case.

Their only claim is (a) that they have acquired title to

the surface estate by adverse possession or (b) that Royal
Street's action is barred by Section 78-12-5 Utah Code
Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977) because of the history of
possession by the Reeds and their tenants and predecessors.

If

the Reeds have not established either of these claims as a
matter of law, as the District Court originally held in denying
the Reeds' Motion for Summary Judgment, it necessarily follows
that the District Court erred in later granting the Reeds'
renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.

This portion of the

Opening Brief urges that the Reeds have not established either
of their claims and that, consequently, the Summary Judgment
appealed from must be reversed and the District Court must be
directed to enter judgment against the Reeds and in favor of
Royal Street.
The determinative issues with respect to the Reeds'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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claim that they have acquired title by adverse possession
concern the assessment and payment of taxes.

In that regard,

Section 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977)
provides, in pertinent part, that:
"In no case, shall adverse possession be
considered established . . . unless it shall be
shown that the land has been occupied and claimed
for seven years continuously, and that the party,
his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes
which have been levied and assessed upon such
land according to law."
As discussed in Part "A" of this portion of this Opening Brief,
the evidence discloses that the Reeds have not and cannot make
this showing.

The only taxes that the Reeds were shown to have

paid or that were shown to have been paid by their predecessors
prior to 1973 were Summit County taxes on buildings or
improvements, not on land.

The Summit County taxes paid by the

Reeds from 1973 through 1978 did include an assessment of the
real property described in Royal Street's original Complaint,
but the Reeds had not paid such taxes for a full seven (7)
years when this action was commenced on October 23, 1979.
Moreover, the Stipulation approved by the District Court on
September 8, 1983 establishes that the property described in
Royal Street's original Complaint was not the land to which the
Reeds actually claimed title by adverse possession.

The

evidence thus disclosed that the Reeds never paid any taxes on
the land in issue, let alone "all" such taxes.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Indeed, the

evidence disclosed that taxes were assessed by the State Tax
Commission upon the surface estate of the land in issue since
at least 1939 and that all such taxes were paid, but not by the
Reeds.
The Reeds' claim that Royal Street's action is barred
because of the history of possession by the Reeds and their
tenants and predecessors is based upon Section 78-12-5 Utah
Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977).

As discussed in part "B"

of this portion of this Opening Brief, this statute cannot
properly be construed to bar this action.

Indeed, the District

Court must have so held in originally denying the Reeds' Motion
for Summary Judgment and there is nothing to suggest that the
District Court changed its mind on this particular point in
later granting the Reeds' renewed Motion for Summary Judgment
and denying Royal Street's Motion for Summary Judgment.
It is, of course, sufficient for present purposes to
observe that the Reeds cannot prevail as a matter of law.

It

bears noting, however, that there is considerable equity in
this result.

The Reeds appear to have acquired only certain

buildings and improvements upon the real property that is the
subject of this action -- and that for nominal consideration.
They have evidently occupied and used those buildings and
improvements and used the real property in issue for most of
the time since 1962. In that time, the Reeds paid nothing to
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Royal Street or its predecessors.

Furthermore, they derived an

undetermined sum from tenants through rentals.

In the years

since 1962, the Reeds paid an aggregate of no more than several
hundred dollars in Summit County taxes, only a small portion of
which were taxes on any real property.

Throughout the period

of their occupancy, the Reeds claim to have expended no more
than about $20,000.00 for improvements to the property.
111).

(R.

In short, the Reeds have had the benefit of the

buildings and improvements and the use of the surface of the
property in issue for more than twenty (20) years at an
exceedingly modest cost to themselves and, possibly, at some
net profit.

There is no compelling equity in their claim that

they should, in light of these facts, be adjudged to have title
to the property as well.

Moreover, even though they cannot

establish title, the Reeds may be entitled to recover the value
of the buildings and other improvements as occupying
claimants.

See Section 57-6-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated

(Repl. Vol. 6B 1974).
A.

THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT THE REEDS DID NOT
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 78-12-12
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (REPL. VOL. 9A 1977)

1.

The Payment by the Reeds or Their Predecessors of
Taxes Assessed by Summit County on Buildings or
Improvements Prior to 1973 Does Not Constitute
the Payment of Taxes on "Land" as Required by
Section 78-12-12.

Section 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A
1977) provides, in pertinent part, that:
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"In no case shall adverse possession be
considered established . . . unless it shall be
shown that the land has been occupied and
claimed for seven years continuously, and that
the party, his predecessors and grantors have
paid all taxes which have been levied and
assessed upon such land according to law."
(Emphasis supplied).
As previously noted, the only taxes shown to have been
assessed by Summit County and paid by the Reeds prior to 1973
were taxes assessed on buildings or improvements and not taxes
on land.

The payment of such taxes does not qualify as the

payment of taxes for purposes of Section 78-12-12.

See,

e.g., Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208,
221-222, 141 P.2d 160, 167 (1943):
"Some effort was made to show that taxes
were paid on the disputed tract by Moses W.
Beckstead, grantor of plaintiff, by reason of the
fact that improvements identified as a house and
other buildings were assessed to Moses W.
Beckstead and plaintiff . . . However, 104-2-12,
R.S.U. 1933 provides: ? In no case shall adverse
possession be considered established . . . unless
it shall be shown that the land has been
occupied and claimed for the period of seven
years continuously, and that the party, his
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes
which have been levied and assessed upon such
land according to law.*" (Emphasis in original).
The memoranda submitted to the District Court by the Reeds in
effect concede this point.
2.

(See, e.g., R. 186).

The Payment by the Reeds of Taxes Assessed by
Summit County from 1973 through 1978 Also
Does Not Satisfy the Requirements of Section
78-12-12.

By virtue of Section 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated
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(Repl. Vol. 9A 1977), claimants to title by adverse possession
must show, among other things, that they or their predecessors
paid all taxes lawfully levied and assessed upon the real
property to which they seek to establish title for an
uninterrupted period of seven (7) years.

See, e.g.,

Christensen v. Munster, 1 Utah 2d 335, 266 P.2d 756 (1954);
Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, supra, 105 Utah at 220, 141
P.2d at 166; Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 170, 152
P. 178, 179 (1915).
Summit County first started to assess taxes to the
Reeds upon a real property description in 1973. The Reeds
evidently paid these taxes, but had not paid them for a full
seven (7) years before this action was commenced on October 23,
1979.

The requirements of Section 78-12-12 are not satisfied

under these circumstances.

See, e.g., Christensen v.

Munster, supra; Homeowners1 Loan Corp. v. Dudley, supra;
Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, supra.
have conceded this point.

The Reeds also appear to

(See, e.g., R. 186).

Furthermore, the real property description upon which
Summit County assessed taxes to the Reeds was the same
description as that utilized in Royal Street's original
Complaint.

The Stipulation approved by the District Court on

September 8, 1983 establishes that that property was not the
property to which the Reeds actually claimed title.
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The evidence thus discloses that the Reeds paid no
taxes upon the real property in issue.
3.

Taxes Were Assessed Upon the Real Property in
Issue, But Such Taxes Were Paid by Royal Street
or Its Predecessors and Not by the Reeds.

In 1980, Summit County assessed the surface estate in
the real property in issue to Royal Street for the years 1977,
1978, 1979, and 1980, along with the surface estate in the
remainder of the 40 acre tract.

These taxes were paid in 1980

by Royal Street, not by the Reeds.
Furthermore, there is no dispute but that between at
least 1939 and through 1977 taxes were assessed by the State
Tax Commission "for both the surface and mineral rights of the
Goodell, Olive Branch, and Trump Millsites", of which the real
property in issue is a part.

(R. 120 and 122-124; emphasis

3.
Corrective assessments of this type are expressly
authorized by Section 57-5-17 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol.
6B 1974), which provides that:
"
Any property discovered by the assessor to have
escaped assessment may be assessed at any time as far
back as five years prior to the time of discovery, and
the assessor shall enter such assessments on the tax
rolls in the hands of the county treasurer or
elsewhere, and when so assessed shall be reported by
the assessor to the county auditor, if made after the
assessment book has been delivered to the county
treasurer, and the auditor shall charge the county
assessor with the taxes on such property, and the
assessor shall give notice to the person assessed
therewith and the assessor shall forthwith proceed to
secure or collect the taxes as provided in chapter 10
of this title."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

supplied.

See also R. 74-76).

It did so pursuant to Section

59-5-57 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 6B 1974) and,
particularly, that part thereof which provides for the
assessment at $5.00 per acre of
mining claims. . . ."

,f

[a]ll metalliferous mines and

(Emphasis supplied).

The fact that

these taxes were assessed to and paid by Royal Street's
predecessors itself precludes the acquisition of title by
adverse possession by the Reeds.

Because the Reeds did not pay

these taxes they failed to pay "all" taxes lawfully assessed
against the property as required by Section 78-12-12 Utah Code
Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977).
Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 P. 1119
(1914) appears to be the first reported Utah decision involving
an attempt by parties who had not paid any State assessed taxes
to establish title by adverse possession to portions of the
surface estate in mining claims taxed by the State to the
mining company that was the record owner of the claims.
However, Chandler was submitted and decided upon the basis of
an agreed statement of facts that renders the case of no
precedental value for purposes of this case.
The plaintiff in Chandler was the record owner of
Mirror Lode Mining Claim in Bingham Canyon.

The State assessed

taxes upon the mining claim to the plaintiff and the plaintiff
paid those taxes.

The defendants claimed the surface estate in

two lots situated upon the mining claim by adverse possession.
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The defendants evidently paid all taxes that were assessed to
them by name and supposed that these taxes, which were
presumably county taxes, included taxes upon the lots and
improvements thereon.

However, it was agreed that the lots and

improvements were not "by the assessment roll or tax records
described with sufficient certainty to identify the same" and
was further agreed as follows:
"It is agreed that the assessments upon the
Mirror Lode Mining Claim and those upon the
premises constituting the subject matter of this
controversy, if the latter be found to have been
made according to law, shall in no manner be
regarded as double assessments, but, on the
contrary, each assessment shall be in itself a
separate and distinct assessment, cumulative
rather than double. All right of either party to
avail themselves of any issue or issues that
might be raised on the ground of a double
assessment is hereby waived." (45 Utah at 86-87,
142 P. at 1119-1120).
Because of the agreement that the State taxes assessed to and
paid by the plaintiff were "separate and distinct" from and
"cumulative" to those paid by the defendants, the Court was not
called upon to decide whether the State taxes paid by the
plaintiff included taxes on the surface estate of the portion
of the mining claims claimed by the defendants within the
meaning of the statute requiring the payment of "all" lawfully
assessed taxes in order to establish title by adverse
possession -- the point that the State assessed taxes include
taxes on the surface estate and preclude the acquisition of
title by adverse possession by parties not paying such taxes
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Kpint> the noint ureed bv Royal Street in this case. Rather,

the question presented in Chandler was whether the taxes
assessed to and paid by the defendants were lawful in form or,
if not, whether since it was agreed that there were no other
taxes assessed to the defendants upon the surface estate in
the two lots claimed by the defendants, the defendants had
acquired title by adverse possession to the surface of the
lots.

The Court, in affirming judgments in favor of the

defendants, held that either the assessments to the defendants
were invalid in form due to indefiniteness and that hence,
under the agreed statement of facts, no taxes were validly
assessed against the surface estate in the two lots or that,
under the agreed statement of facts, the defendants had paid
the only taxes assessed to them against the surface estate in
the two lots, and that, in either case, the defendants had
acquired title by adverse possession. (45 Utah at 88, 142 P.
4
at 1120).
In Chandler, it was, in effect, agreed that, for

4.
The Chandler opinion contains a discussion seemingly
approving separate county taxation to an adverse claimant of
the surface estate of mining claims improved and occupied for
purposes other than mining and implying that the taxes assessed
by the State did not include the surface estate in such claims
(45 Utah at 87, 142 P. at 1120); however, this discussion
reflects little, if any, consideration of these issues and was
obviously unnecessary to the decision actually reached by the
Court. The Court did not need to reach the question of the
scope of the taxes assessed by the State or the propriety of
county taxation of the surface estate to an adverse claimant
because it concluded, under the agreed statement of facts, that
the county taxes were either invalid due to form or that the
defendants had paid the only taxes assessed against the surface
estate in
theby the
two
lots. (See the further discussion of the
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the purposes of the statute requiring the payment of "all"
lawfully assessed taxes in order to establish title by adverse
possession, the taxes assessed by the State did not include
the surface estate of the two lots claimed by the defendants or
preclude the defendants from acquiring title by adverse
possession.

In contrast, in the instant case it is clear that

the taxes assessed by the State Tax Commission and paid by
Royal Street's predecessors did include the surface estate in
the real property claimed by the defendants and must preclude
the defendants from acquiring title by adverse possession.
Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178
(1915), which was decided just one year after Chandler by a
Court composed of the same members as the Chandler Court,
recognizes the limited scope of the Chandler holding and
clearly indicates that Chandler is not controlling in this
case.
Eckman involved the Mirror Lode Mining Claim and the
Copper Cent Claim in Bingham Canyon.

The plaintiff brought the

action to recover a portion of the surface area of these mining
claims, which had been improved and platted into town lots.
The District Court entered judgment for the defendant and the
plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff, which was the record owner

of the mining claims, had paid the taxes assessed on the mining
claims by the State.

The defendants had evidently also paid
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taxes upon the surface estate of the lots and upon the
improvements thereon.

Unlike Chandler, however, there was no

agreement as to whether the taxes paid by the plaintiff upon
the Mirror Lode Mining Claim were assessed upon both the
surface and the mineral estate in the mining claims and there
was no agreement that such taxes could be disregarded for
purposes of the requirement that an adverse claimant pay "all"
lawfully assessed taxes in order to establish title by adverse
possession:
"While it is quite clear that in this case that
the surface area of the Mirror Lode mining claim
which is in controversy here was used and
improved by the defendant for other than mining
purposes. . . , yet it does not appear that in
assessing tht mining claim to the appellant . . .
it was not assessed for all purposes; that is,
for the purpose of mining claim and also such
purposes as the surface was devoted to." (47
Utah at 171, 151 P. at 180).
This prompted the Court to reverse and remand the case to the
District Court for further findings:
"In view that the findings with respect to
the assessment and payment of taxes are not
complete, we cannot even affirm the judgment with
respect to the disputed area of the Mirror lode,
although, as we have seen, the defendant seems to
have been in possession of the surface area of
that lode for the length of time required by our
statute after the title had passed from the
United States to acquire title thereto by adverse
possession." (47 Utah at 173, 152 P. at 181).
The clear implication of the foregoing is that if the taxes
assessed on the mining claim by the State were assessed upon
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both the surface and the mineral estate, the adverse claimant
might not acquire title by adverse possession without paying
other taxes upon the land, or even by paying such other
taxes.
In this case, the fact that between at least 1939 and
through 1977 taxes were assessed by the State Tax Commission
"for both the surface and mineral rights'1 of the mining claims
necessitates a finding that such taxes were assessed against
the surface estate of the real property in issue. As
previously noted, this alone precludes the Reeds from acquiring
title by adverse possession.
Indeed, it is not only clear under the facts of this
case that the taxes assessed by the State Tax Commission were
assessed against the surface estate; it is clear that no other
result can be squared with the statutes governing the taxation
of mining claims and particularly Section 59-5-57 Utah Code

5.
The Eckman decision discusses the Chandler decision,
characterizing Chandler as approving separate county taxation
to an adverse claimant of the surface estate of mining claims
occupied for purposes other than mining and implying that the
State assessed taxes do not include the surface estate under
such circumstances. (47 Utah at 171, 152 P. at 180). However,
as was the case in Chandler itself, the Court in Eckman was
not presented with this question. (See note 4, supra, and
the further discussion of the Chandler and Eckman decisions
infra at pages 28 through 29).
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Annotated (Repl. Vol. 6B 1974).

Section 59-5-57 provides, in

this regard, that:
"All metalliferous mines and mining claims,
both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed
at $5.00 per acre and in addition thereto at a
value equal to two times the average net annual
proceeds thereof for the three calendar years
next preceding or for as many years next
preceding as the mine has been operating,
whichever is less; provided, however, there shall
be no valuation based upon net annual proceeds
for the purpose of assesement of any such mine or
mining claim for any one year in which there were
no gross proceeds realized in the year next
preceding the year of assessment. All other
mines or mining claims and other valuable mineral
deposits, including lands containing coal or
hydrocarbons, shall be assessed at thirty per
cent of their reasonable fair cash value. All
machinery used in mining and all property or
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines
or mining claims and the value of any surface use
made of mining claims or mining property for
other than mining purposes shall be assessed at
thirty per cent of their reasonable fair cash
value. In all cases where the surface of lands
is owned by one person and the mineral estate
underlying such lands is owned by another, such
property rights shall be separately assessed to
the respective owners. In such cases the value
of the surface if it is used for other than
mining purposes shall be assessed by the assessor
of the county in which the property is
situated."

(Emphasis supplied).

Under Section 59-5-57, the State Tax Commission is
granted the exclusive authority to tax "mining claims" so long
as the surface and the mineral estate in the claims are in
common ownership.

Since the legislature obviously intended

This Section was amended in 1981. However, the
amendment is of no consequence to this case.
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that the authority to tax the surface estate in mining claims
always rest in some taxing authority, it follows that, under
such circumstances, the State Tax Commission's assessment of
ff

mining claims'1 at the rate of $5.00 per acre includes both the

surface and the mineral estate of such mining claims. This
conclusion is also supported by the fact that it is only where
the surface "is used for other than mining purposes" and where
the surface and the mineral estate are "owned" by different
persons that counties are authorized to tax the surface.
Prior to 1975, the surface and the mineral estate in
the Trump Millsite, the Goodell Millsite, and the Olive Branch
Millsite, of which the real property in issue is a part, were
in common ownership and the taxes assessed by the State Tax
Commission and paid by Royal Street's predecessors included the
surface estate in the claims.

Only after the ownership of the

surface estate and the mineral estate were formally severed by
United Park in 1975 could the assessments made by the State Tax
Commission have ceased to include the surface estate and only
then would Summit County have lawfully assessed the surface
estate.

However, the surface estate was then assessed to Royal

Street.

The Reeds undoubtedly used the surface of the real

property in issue for non-mining purposes, but they never
"owned" the surface.

Their status is and always has been, at

best, that of claimants to ownership.

Moreover, because they
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did not pay any State assessed taxes and did not and could not
have paid any lawfully assessed Summit County taxes on the real
property for a full seven (7) years prior to the commencement
of this action, they did not pay "all" lawfully assessed taxes
upon the surface estate and cannot establish title to the
surface estate by adverse possession.
Language in Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85,
142 P. 1119 (1914) and Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165,

7.
In the District Court, the Reeds attempted to make
something of the fact that the taxes assessed by the State Tax
Commission were assessed under Section 57-5-57 at the rate of
$5.00 per acre and did not include a separate assessment for
"surface improvements" or "the value of [the] surface use . . .
for other than mining purposes" at the rate of "thirty percent
of their reasonable fair cash value." See, e.g., R.
181-183). In this connection, the Reeds argued that Royal
Street's predecessors should have had the State Tax Commission
levy additional assessments on the value of the "surface
improvements" or "surface use" made by the Reeds. However, the
situation would be no different if the State Tax Commission had
so assessed Royal Street's predecessors for an additional tax
on "surface improvements" and "surface uses". In that case,
there still would have been State taxes lawfully assessed
against the surface estate and not paid by the Reeds. This
"point" is therefore of no consequence. Cj:. Telonis v.
Staley, 104 Utah 537, 541, 144 P.2d 513, 515 (1943), where the
Court observed that:
"In this case, Union Pacific Coal Company, grantor
of plaintiff, owned both the surface and mineral
rights in the land used for mining purposes. It made
no request that the surface be taxed on its valuation
separately from the mines and mineral rights. Owing
to the common ownership and failure of the owner to
request separate taxation, it was proper . . . to
aggregate the valuations of both surface and mineral
rights in applying the tax levy and in all proceedings
subsequent thereto."
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152 P. 178 (1915) appears to approve the separate taxation -presumably by a county - to an adverse claimant of the surface
estate of mining claims improved and occupied for purposes
other than mining and might be incorrectly read to imply that
the taxes assessed by the State to the record claim owner do
not extend to the surface estate under such circumstances.

(45

Utah at 87, 142 P. at 1120; 47 Utah at 171, 152 P. at 180).
However, neither case actually decided that question.

In

Chandler, the Court held that either the assessment to the
defendants was invalid in form due to indefiniteness and that
hence, under the agreed statement of facts, no taxes were
validly assessed against the surface estate or that, under the
agreed statement of facts, the defendants had paid the only
taxes assessed to them against the surface estate.
88, 142 P. at 1120).

(45 Utah at

The Chandler Court concluded that, in

either case, the defendants had acquired title by adverse
possession.

(45 Utah at 88, 142 P. at 1120).

The Court in

Eckman merely discussed Chandler in holding that the District
Court's findings were inadequate to permit it to determine
whether the taxes assessed to the plaintiff by the State
included taxes upon both the surface and the mineral estate in
the Mirror Lode Mining Claim.

(47 Utah at 173, 152 P. at

180-181).
The issue of the scope of the taxes assessed upon
mining properties by the State Tax Commission prior to a formal
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severance of the ownership of the surface and mineral estate in
the properties appears to have first received express
consideration by Justice Wolfe in concurring in part in the
decision in Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 505, 525, 106 P.2d
163, 172 (1940), overruled, 104 Utah 537, 144 P.2d 513
(1943).

Justice Wolfe there noted that the statutes appear to

authorize separate taxation of the surface estate in a mining
property or mining claim only where it is "owned" by a person
other than the record owner of the mineral estate and observed
that a mere adverse claimant should not be deemed to have an
ownership interest such as would render a State assessed tax a
tax only on the mineral estate:
"Although this court seemingly held'
differently in Utah Copper v. Chandler, 45 Utah
85, 142 P. 1119, followed in Utah Copper Company
v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178, to the effect
that surface rights used for other than mining
purposes constitute a separate estate, I incline
to the view that theyare not such until severed
by the owner by some unequivocal act such as a
transfer of them to different persons, or
transferring one and retaining the other.
Otherwise, difficulties in regard to title by
adverse possession present themselves." (104
Utah at 525, 106 P.2d at 172; emphasis supplied).
Later, writing for the Court in Aggelos v. Zella Mining Co.,
99 Utah 417, 107 P.2d 170 (1940), Justice Wolfe made it clear
that the Chandler and Eckman decisions were not dispositive
of the issues:
"However, in our view of the case we do not
need to decide whether the assessment by the
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State Tax Commission of mining claims on the
basis of a value of $5 per acre, as provided bySection 80-5-56, R.S.U. 1933, for unimproved
mining claims, constitutes a complete assessment
of the property so that a person claiming either
the surface or sub-surface rights to that
property would have to pay the taxes so assessed
in order to comply with the provisions of Section
104-2-12, hereinbefore quoted. See Utah Copper
v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 P. 1119; and Utah
Copper Company v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178.
Nor do we need to decide whether an individual
can by his occupation of the surface of mining
property and erection of improvements thereon
cause or initiate by those very acts a separation
of the surface from the sub-surface right so as
to necessitate a separate assessment of such
property rights as provided for by Section
80-5-56, R.S.U. 1933, on the theory that fthe
surface of lands is owned by one person [the
person occupying the same] and the mineral
underlying such lands is owned by another [the
person having record title to the mining claim]f
(see Rio Grande Western Railway Company v. Salt
Lake Investment Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586); or
whether an individual, who has thus caused a
separate assessment of the surface rights of
mining property on the theory that such
individual is the owner of these surface rights
and pays the taxes so assessed can subsequently
claim title to the surface rights on the theory
that he is an adverse claimant who has occupied
the property and paid the taxes thereon as
required by the statute. See Rio Grande Western
Railway Company v. Salt Lake Investment Co.,
supra. (99 Utah at 419, 420, 107 P.2d at 171).
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35
Utah 528, 101 P. 586 (1909) is closely analogous to the issues
in this case and, read in light of the view expressed by
Justice Wolfe in Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 505, 106 P.2d 163
(1940), overruled, 104 Utah 537, 144 P.2d 513 (1943) and in
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light of the Aggelos decision, must be read to support the
conclusion that, in the absence of a formal severance of the
surface and the mineral estate, the State Tax Commission's
assessments of mining claims extend to both the surface and the
mineral estate in such claims and preclude the acquisition of
title by adverse possession where the party claiming to have
acquired such title did not pay the State assessed taxes.
In the Rio Grande case, the plaintiff-railroad and
the defendant each claimed to be the owner of a strip of real
property by adverse possession.

The plaintiff had listed the

disputed strip with the State Board of Equalization for
taxation as railroad property and had paid all taxes assessed
by the Board.

The defendant had paid taxes assessed upon a

part of the strip by Salt Lake County as "lot 8".

The District

Court entered judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff
appealed.

In affirming the judgment, the Court held that the

strip was not, in fact, the property of the plaintiff and that
the plaintiff could not confer authority upon the State Board
of Equalization to assess the strip merely by listing it as
railroad property.

(35 Utah at 539, 101 P. at 590). The Court

further held that the plaintiff could not acquire title to the
strip by adverse possession by paying the taxes assessed by the
Board because those assessments were invalid and because the
strip was lawfully assessed by Salt Lake County:
"From the time it would have obtained title, and
not before, could the railroad company lawfully
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list it as railroad property and oust the county
assessor of jurisdiction. It might be that in
case property claimed by the railroad company,
and of which it has possession, was not assessed
by the local assessor but was assessed by the
State Board of Equalization, or not assessed at
all, the railroad company might acquire title by
adverse possession after the seven-year period.
This would be so, however, upon the ground that
the railroad company in such a case would have
paid all the taxes that were assessed against the
property. If it were held otherwise, the
railroad company could claim any one's property
and have it assessed by the State Board of
Equalization and pay the taxes thereon as such,
and thus prevent the individual owner from paying
the taxes on his own property under the
description by which it is generally known. No
doubt appellant could have acquired title by
adverse possession to all of lot 8 the same as
any one else could have done, but, in order to
have done so, it would have been required to pay
the taxes assessed against lot 8 by that
description, the same as any one else would have
been required to pay them. By assessing lot 8
the parcel in question was always assessed as a
part of it. Baldwin v. Temple, supra. Appellant
did not pay the taxes on lot 8 except for the
year 1906. Upon the other hand, respondent and
its predecessors in interest, during all of the
years since 1882, paid the taxes assessed against
lot 8.?f (35 Utah at 539-540, 101 P. at 590).
Just as the plaintiff in Rio Grande was not the owner
of the strip listed by it with the State Board of Equalization,
the Reeds were not the owners of the surface estate in the real
property that is the subject of this action when it was first
assessed to them by Summit County.

Just as the plaintiff in

Rio Grande could not deprive Salt Lake County of its authority
to assess lot 8 by listing the strip with the Board, the Reeds
could not deprive the State Tax Commission of its authority to
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assess the surface estate of the mining claims by their mere
occupation and use of that part thereof which comprises the
real property in issue, by obtaining assessments from Summit
County on that property, or by any other means. Just as the
plaintiff in Rio Grande could not acquire title by adverse
possession to the strip without having paid the taxes assessed
by Salt Lake County, the Reeds could not acquire title by
adverse possession to the surface estate in the real property
in issue without having paid the taxes assessed by the State
Tax Commission.
The evidence discloses that the Reeds did not satisfy
the requirements of Section 78-12-12. The Reeds, therefore,
did not establish title by adverse possession.
B.

SECTION 78-12-5 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (REPL. VOL.
9A 1977) DOES NOT BAR ROYAL STREET1S ACTION

Section 78-12-5 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A
1977) provides that:
"No action for the recovery of real property
or for the possession thereof shall be
maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff,
his ancestor, grantor or predecessor was seized
or possessed of the property in question within
seven years before the commencement of the
action." (Emphasis supplied).
Section 78-12-5 requires only that the plaintiff or its
predecessors be "seized" or "possessed" of the property within
the seven (7) year period.

The Reedsf reliance on the history

of possession by them and by their tenants and predecessors
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overlooks the fact that throughout that time Royal Street and
its predecessors were seized of the property by reason of
their record ownership of the legal title to the property.
Because Royal Street and its predecessors were seized of the
property within the seven (7) year period, Section 78-12-5
cannot bar Royal Street's action.
Section 78-12-7 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A
1977) serves to confirm tht Section 78-12-5 is not intended to
bar an action by a plaintiff holding legal title within the
seven (7) year period.

That Section provides as follows:

"In every action for the recovery of real
property, or the possession thereof, the persons
establishing a legal title to the property shall
be presumed to have been possessed thereof within
the time required by law; and the occupation of
the property by any other person shall be deemed
to have been under and in subordination to the
legal title, unless it appears that the property
has been held and possessed adversely to such
legal title for seven years before the
commencement of the action."
Under Section 78-12-7, the party proving legal title
is presumed to have had possession and the possession of any
other party is presumed to have been under and subordinate to
the legal title.

Consequently, a history of possession by

another party or its predecessors cannot of itself impair the
legal title of the record owner or operate to bar an action to
quiet title under Section 78-12-5.

Since Royal Street

unquestionably has legal title to the real property in issue,
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it is presumed to have had possession and its action cannot be
held barred by Section 78-12-5.
Moreover, by the very terms of Section 78-12-7, the
presumption created by the Section cannot be rebutted "unless
it appears that the property has been held and possessed
adversely to such legal title for seven years before the
commencement of the action."

In other words, the presumption

of possession fails to apply only where title by adverse
possession is proven to exist in the party in possession, and
title by adverse possession is acquired not through mere
possession, but through possession and, among other things,
payment of taxes.

See, e.g., Keller v. Chournos, 102 Utah

535, 545, 133 P.2d 318, 323 (1943) (ten years1 possession did
not bar action where taxes paid for only a four year period
before action commenced); Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227,
231, 26 P. 291, 292-293 (1891):
"The statute does not, in effect, presume a
grant and give the person relying upon it the
title from seven years' possession alone. The
presumption is made from the fact that the land
is held adversely; and to make the holding
adverse the land must have been protected by a
substantial inclosure, or it must have been
usually cultivated and improved, or labor or
money must have been expended to irrigate it,
amounting to the sum of five dollars per acre.
And in either case the occupation and claim must
have been continuous for the seven years and
during that time the claimant, his predecessors
or grantors, must have paid all taxes levied and
assessed upon the land according to law."
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The foregoing compels the conclusion that Section
78-12-5 can never be held to bar a quiet title action by a
party holding legal record title unless the opposing party
actually succeeds in proving title by adverse possession.
Royal Street is aware of no holding to the contrary.
Indeed, the tax title statute, Section 78-12-5.1 Utah
Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977) supports the foregoing
analysis.

Section 78-12-5.1 provides in pertinent part, that:

"No action for the recovery of real property
or for the possession thereof shall be
maintained, unless the plaintiff or his
predecessor was seized or possessed of such
property within seven years from the commencement
of such action; provided, however, that with
respect to actions or defenses brought or
interposed for the recovery or possession of or
to quiet title or determine the ownership of real
property against the holder of a tax title to
such property, no such action or defense shall be
commenced or interposed more than four years
after the date of the tax deed, conveyance or
transfer creating such tax title unless the
person commencing or interposing such action or
defense or his predecessor has actually occupied
or been in possession of such property within
four years prior to the commencement or
interposition of such action or defense. . . . "
(Emphasis supplied.)
The language emphasized above serves to contrast the
requirements applicable under Section 78-12-5.1 to actions
challenging tax titles and those applicable under Section
78-12-5 to other actions, including this action.

Section

78-12-5.1 bars an action if the plaintiff or its predecessors
were not "seized or possessed" of the property and had not
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fy

actually occupied or been in possession of such property

. • . ."

(Emphasis supplied.)

Section 78-12-5, in contrast,

bars an action only if the plaintiff or its predecessors were
not "seized or possessed" of the property.

The requirements of

Section 78-12-5.1 are more rigorous than those of 78-12-5.
Mere occupancy and use by an opposing party will bar an action
challenging a tax title under Section 78-12-5.1. Obviously, if
the legislature had intended that mere occupancy and use by an
opposing party bar other actions under 78-12-5, it could
readily have so provided.

The fact that the legislature did

not so provide is itself strongly supportive of Royal Street's
position.

Further support of Royal Street's position can be

found in this Court's analysis in the recent case of
Fredericksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 831-832 (Utah 1981).
Finally, it is a fundamental precept that a party
claiming title in a quiet title action must establish title in
itself and cannot merely assert defects in its opponent's
title.

See, e.g., Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley,

supra.

This precept would be directly violated if the Court

were to hold this action barred under Section 78-12-5 despite
the fact that the Reeds cannot prove that they have title by
adverse possession.
Section 78-12-5, therefore, does not bar Royal
Street's action.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REJECTING CERTAIN OF
ROYAL STREET'S OBJECTIONS TO THE FORM OF THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

For the reasons explained in part "I" of the
"Argument" portion of this Opening Brief, the Summary Judgment
appealed from must be reversed and the District Court must be
directed to enter judgment against the Reeds and in favor of
Royal Street.

While those reasons appear to be unassailable

and to require that result, Royal Street asks, in the
alternative, that this Court remand this case to the District
Court for further proceedings.

The principal grounds for this

alternative request for relief are that the District Court
erred in rejecting those of Royal Street's objections to the
form of the Summary Judgment which asserted (a) that the Reeds
had failed to show the payment of any taxes on the property
that they actually claimed and (b) that a portion of this
property actually claimed by the Reeds had been dedicated by
Royal Street to Park City as a roadway.
A.

THE OBJECTION THAT THE REEDS FAILED TO SHOW THE
PAYMENT OF ANY TAXES ON THE PROPERTY THAT THEY
ACTUALLY CLAIMED

As previously noted, at the time that the District
Court entered its minute entry denying Royal Street's Motion
and granting the Reeds' renewed Motion, the District Court was
unaware that the property actually claimed by the Reeds was not
that described in Royal Street's original Complaint.
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Since the

only taxes paid by the Reeds upon real property were paid upon
a property description identical to that appearing in Royal
Street's original Complaint, the District Court no doubt
assumed that the Reeds had paid at least some taxes upon the
real property in issue.
From all that appears, the District Court never really
confronted the fact that the Reeds had not paid any taxes on
the property that they actually claimed.

If this Court for

some reason is not otherwise able to hold for Royal Street on
the adverse possession issue, it ought, at the very least, to
remand this case to the District Court to permit it to consider
this fact.
B.

THE OBJECTION BASED UPON THE DEDICATION BY ROYAL
STREET TO PARK CITY

Because Royal Street's original Complaint did not
describe the property actually claimed by the Reeds, the
District Court was also not apprised that Royal Street had
dedicated a portion of that property to Park City at the time
that it entered its minute entry denying Royal Street's Motion
and granting the Reeds' renewed Motion.

Since Park City was

not a party to this case, the District Court's judgment
obviously could not determine rights claimed by Park City.
Furthermore, in light of the dedication, it would appear that
Park City and not Royal Street would be the proper party to the
action with respect to the dedicated property.
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Since the District Court never really confronted this
issue, this Court should remand this case in order to permit
consideration of this issue by the District Court or to permit
the modification of the Summary Judgment to exclude the
dedicated property.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment
appealed from must be reversed and the District Court must be
directed to enter judgment against the Reeds and in favor of
Royal Street.

In the alternative, this Court should remand

this case to the District Court for further proceedings.
DATED this \^i

day of December, 1983.
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